Analyze this; 2.5

“On a scale of one to five, which number represents thermonuclear war and which represents peace? The answer is simple; it depends on the value of one.”

This question is an oversimplified explanation of quantitative analysis. Every action has a numeric value and when those values are taken together, massaged with an algorithm, and plotted on a graph they tell you everything you need to know. Ask yourself this however, is that really true? Can quantitative analysis really tell you what you need to know in each discipline? Perhaps in finances, traffic accidents, and poker games the answer is yes, but when it comes to real world risk analysis, numbers are as useful as elven magic.

Before you click away in an angry huff, consider this: You’ve been asked to analyze the risk of recidivism of a convicted felon who is about to be released from prison. When you look through his criminal history you see he committed two armed robberies, six shoplifts, and four assaults over a three year period. He spent the last seven years in prison. Based on that information what is his risk of recidivism?

Odds are if you presented those facts to a criminal intelligence analyst or a police detective you would be told the risk is high. They would assign a numerical value to each crime, add them up, use some crazy algorithm and tell you this person is going to be a problem. If you went strictly by the numbers, then yes, this ex-con will more than likely offend again. If you step outside of the number parameters however, you encounter the reality of the assessment which is, the ex-con is a human being.

Saying the convict is human is not social commentary, it’s a fact that requires a different method for cataloging. Enter qualitative analysis. Based on the person’s history there is cause to believe he may re-offend, however there are several variables at play. For example, what were the socio-economic conditions of the subject prior to incarceration? Has the person found religion while in prison? What conditions will greet the subject upon his release? What factors that were present seven years ago will still be present upon release? All of these questions are extremely important when analyzing the risk of recidivism or any risk involving human beings. If you don’t believe me, ask yourself this; what number value should be associated with anomalous human behavior?

The challenges facing an analyst converted to the world of qualitative analysis is knowing which questions to ask and where they rank in the final risk analysis. Each situation demands a new grouping of questions, however over time, the analyst will recognize core questions asked in each analysis. This is why risk analysis on people require more than one analyst and should go through a rigorous vetting process with other equally skilled analysts. After all, we are mapping human behavior and can’t exclude the possibility of personal bias.

It is time we train our law enforcement risk analysts and investigators to use a qualitative system. It will be a change, and challenges lie ahead, but as we encounter the growing need for threat intelligence, predictive analysis, and efficient forecasting we need to focus on the reason for the analysis; evaluating possibility. Numbers alone won’t do the trick.

Exploiting Criminal Syndicate Risks

Combating organized crime is like cleaning oil off your driveway. There are dozens of methods to clean up the mess, yet none of them will do the job alone. Deciding how to clean the mess is just as frustrating as actually cleaning. In the same manner, many law enforcement organizations don’t know where to begin when routing out syndicate crime. In most cases law enforcement aims their resources at the most obvious areas; street level criminals and money. These are not altogether bad tactics however just like cleaning the sludge off your driveway a few methods alone will not eradicate the syndicate. Instead of traditional methods for combating organized crime, law enforcement can learn a few tricks from traditional risk analysis.

Syndicates thrive off the fact they don’t appear complicated on the surface. However, they typically sink deep roots into one or more methods of preserving their existence which adds layers of complexity. Their diffused rooting, while necessary for survival, is also a weakness and can be exploited through common risk analysis.  For example, when examining supply chains, business continuity plans, or site security we look at several factors including communication, redundancy, and resiliency. Using this same tactic we can expose risks within organized criminal syndicates and exploit them to collapse the enterprise.

The first step in analyzing a syndicate’s risk is to map their internal structure. For example, all successful criminal syndicates have at least three levels of organization; upper leadership, mid-level management, and foot soldiers. Many syndicates will have other operational and management levels. To adequately collapse the order you need to know the structure from top to bottom and understand how each level interacts with ones above and below. Mapping may not be easy if the syndicate utilized a cellular structure however that too has weaknesses that can be exploited.

The next step is to detail what the syndicate needs to survive. In most cases you find common needs like communication, recruits, and possibly money. There may be several “needs” and the more the better because with more needs comes more risk. Once you have mapped out the groups’ needs, overlay them on the structure. This will let you see which level of the group is responsible for these needs. At this point, several “red flags” will become obvious. These red flags are what we call “risks.” If no red flags are obvious then deeper analysis may be needed to expose other facets of the group like ideology and cultural dependency.

Similar to prioritizing risks for mitigation, you now prioritize the syndicate’s risks for exploitation. Target one element and become the threat directly associated to that risk. In some cases where the risks are cultural this will require non-traditional law enforcement techniques like outreach and collaboration. In syndicates where the risks are not cultural and easily identified, exploiting the weakness will threaten the group’s entire stability.

Combating organized crime through risk analysis is of course more complicated than described above, however the basic template will not change. Every criminal syndicate has weaknesses, it’s up to law enforcement to find the weaknesses, exploit them fully, and eradicate the group.